The effect of globalization on the distribution of taxes and social expenditures in Europe: Do welfare state regimes matter? by Onaran, Özlem & Bösch, Valerie
ePubWU Institutional Repository
Özlem Onaran and Valerie Bösch
The effect of globalization on the distribution of taxes and social expenditures
in Europe: Do welfare state regimes matter?
Working Paper (Published)
Original Citation:
Onaran, Özlem and Bösch, Valerie (2010) The effect of globalization on the distribution of taxes
and social expenditures in Europe: Do welfare state regimes matter? Discussion Papers SFB
International Tax Coordination, 40. WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna.
This version is available at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/2795/
Available in ePubWU: October 2010
ePubWU, the institutional repository of the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, is
provided by the University Library and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to the
scholarly output of the WU.
This document is the publisher-created published version.
http://epub.wu.ac.at/
The effect of globalization on
the distribution of taxes and social expenditures in Europe:
Do welfare state regimes matter?
Ozlem Onaran
Valerie Boesch








The effect of globalization on 
the distribution of taxes and social expenditures in Europe: 
Do welfare state regimes matter? 
 





*Corresponding author, Middlesex University Business School, 
Department of Economics and Statistics, The Burroughs, London NW4 4BT, 
UK Phone: +44 20 8411 5956, e-mail: o.onaran@mdx.ac.uk. 
** Vienna University of Economics and Business, Research Institute 
International Taxation, Augasse 2-6, A-1090 Vienna, Austria, Phone: +43 1 
31336 5932, e-mail: valerie.boesch@wu.ac.at. 
 
The authors are grateful to Richard Croucher, Michael Klien, 
Oliver Prausmüller, and Ilker Atac for very helpful comments. Support 





The effect of globalization on the distribution of taxes and social 
expenditures in Europe: Do welfare state regimes matter? 
 
Abstract 
This paper estimates the effect of globalization on the implicit tax rates 
(ITR) on capital income, labor income and consumption, and the share of social 
protection expenditures in total public expenditures in Western and Eastern 
Europe. It tests the coexistence of efficiency and compensation effects of 
globalization on the expenditure as well as the revenue sides of government 
budgets.  In Western Europe, globalization leads to an increase in social 
expenditures; however these expenditures are to an increasing extent financed 
by taxes on labor income. There is no effect of the ITR on capital income, 
whereas the ITR on consumption decreases. There are important differences 
between the welfare states. In the conservative regimes, social expenditures 
increase due to globalization, but they are financed to an increasing extent by 
taxes on labor. In the social democratic regimes, not only social expenditures, 
but also the ITRs on capital income and consumption decrease as a result of 
globalization, whereas the ITR on labor income increases. In the liberal 
regimes, the ITR on labor income is rising, while social expenditures and the 
ITR on consumption is declining. In the southern regimes,  the ITRs on both 
capital income and  consumption are decreasing. In the CEE NMS, on average, 
there seems to be no statistically significant effect of globalization on social 
expenditures nor on the ITR on capital and labor income. Globalization affects 
only the ITR on consumption, leading to a decline. However, different welfare 
regimes react differently: there is a negative effect of globalization on social 
spending in the Baltic countries, and a negative effect on the ITR on capital 
income in the post-communist European regimes.  
Key words: globalization, efficiency, compensation, social 
expenditures, implicit tax rate on labor income, capital income, and 
consumption, welfare regimes 
JEL Code: H23, H24, H25, H50, F19, F21  
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1.  Introduction 
This paper analyses the effect of globalization on social expenditures 
and the distribution of taxes, i.e. the tax burden on capital income, labor 
income, and consumption in Western and Eastern Europe, building on the 
literature on tax and fiscal competition. We test the coexistence of efficiency 
and compensation effects of globalization on the expenditure as well as the 
revenue sides of government budgets with a particular focus on differences 
between welfare regimes.  
Tax competition theory argues that the increasing mobility of capital 
makes firms capable of avoiding taxes by choosing countries with a lower tax 
burden. Thus, capital mobility creates a pressure to reduce taxes on the mobile 
factor, which results in inefficiently low levels of capital taxes and public good 
provision (Oates, 1972; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986).
1
 If government 
expenditures are held constant, this implies a shift of the tax burden to the 
immobile factor, i.e. labor, to finance a given level of expenditures. 
Regarding the expenditure side, there are two hypotheses on the impact 
of globalization on public expenditures. The efficiency hypothesis argues that 
globalization leads to increasing competition among nations to attract the 
mobile factor of production, i.e. capital. This in turn leads to an erosion in tax 
revenues and to a decline in public expenditures (e.g. Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski; 1986 Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Dreher et al., 2008a). 
Additionally, increasing competition changes the composition of public 
spending and leads to a shift from public goods to public inputs, i.e. a shift 
from expenditures that are mainly beneficial for residents to expenditures 
which aim at attracting firms (e.g. Keen and Marchand, 1997). The 
compensation hypothesis argues to the contrary: that globalization is 
accompanied by an increase in spending on public inputs, in particular 
                                                     
1
 For a comprehensive overview see Wilson (1999) and Krogstrup (2004). 
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compensating social protection expenditures (Rodrik, 1998; Swank, 2002; 
Garrett and Mitchell, 2001). The background assumption of this hypothesis is 
that globalization is leading to an increase in external risks and thereby to 
greater volatility in domestic income and consumption. Governments increase 
expenditures, and in particular social security and welfare spending, to mitigate 
that risk by reducing volatility for citizens. Thus, the citizens‟ demand for 
social expenditure changes the structure of government expenditures and 
increases its level. The two hypotheses may be complementary rather than 
conflicting, as ,in reality, there are two opposing effects of globalization on 
expenditures working through these two channels, i.e. efficiency pressures and 
the demand for compensation, which might even offset each other.  
Although there is a rich empirical literature on the effects of 
globalization on either the spending- or the revenue-side of the government 
budget, studies that analyze the effects on both taxation and spending 
simultaneously are, to the best of our knowledge, limited to Bretschger and 
Hettich (2002), Adam and Kammas (2007), Dreher (2006a) and Dreher et al. 
(2008a).  Bretschger and Hettich (2002) and Adam and Kammas (2007) 
interpret their results as evidence of  joint existence of the efficiency and 
compensation hypotheses, albeit via opposite effects on the two sides of the 
budget.  On the one hand the tax burden is shifting from capital to labor, which 
militates in favor of the efficiency hypothesis. On the other hand, social 
expenditures are increasing due to globalization, which is consistent with the 
compensation hypothesis. 
Our paper belongs to this strand of literature.  It uses an updated 
database covering the period 1970-2007. Using two different sets of panel data 
for the old EU member states  (EU 15) and the Central and Eastern European 
New Member States (CEE NMS), we estimate the effect of globalization on the 
implicit tax rates (ITR) on capital income, labor income and consumption, and 
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the share of social protection expenditures in total public expenditures. Most 
studies focus on taxes on capital and labor income, and omit the taxes on 
consumption. However, as taxes on consumption are regressive taxes, which 
create a heavier tax burden on lower income groups, it is important to observe 
the effects of globalization on taxes on consumption as well. On the 
expenditure side, we use social protection expenditures as the best component 
of spending to test the compensation vs. the efficiency hypothesis, since it is 
clearly a public consumption good, whereas education or health can be public 
consumption goods as well as public inputs as they are part of human capital. As 
a measure of globalization we employ comprehensive indices of globalization 
developed by Dreher (2006b) and Dreher et al (2008a), which capture the 
economic as well as the social and political dimensions of globalization. 
The first contribution of our paper is the focus on Western Europe and 
the Central and Eastern European New Member States. Secondly, we estimate 
whether the effects differ between the different welfare state regimes in both 
the West and the East. Leibrecht et al. (2011) is the only study in this literature 
that distinguishes the effects in different welfare regimes in Western Europe, 
but they do not account for differences within the CEE NMS due to the short 
time series they use. We use an updated data set for both the EU 15 and the 
CEE NMS, and the extension of the data back to 1995 and the inclusion of 
2007 also allows us to distinguish different regimes in the CEE NMS. Our 
database for the Western European countries also dates back to 1980s for some 
countries. Furthermore, Leibrecht et al. (2011) estimate only the effects of 
globalization on social expenditures whereas we analyze the expenditure as 
well as the revenue side.   
Welfare regimes, and hence national economic and political institutions 
matter, as they shape or narrow how states react to globalization via tax and 
spending decisions (Campbell, 2005). Different dependencies within the 
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population and citizens‟ expectations of the responsibilities of the welfare 
states are created in an historical institutional context and change may be slow 
(Kautto and Kvist, 2002). Thus path dependency is an important factor in tax 
and expenditure policy (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000; Esping-Andersen, 1999). 
Different welfare states also create different types of labor and business 
organizations and alliances, which in turn have an impact on the tax and 
expenditures policy and reforms (Campbell, 2005). For example, in social-
democratic countries tax rates on both capital and labor income are the highest 
in Europe, since there is a social consensus about high tax rates as the revenue 
is utilized to finance expenditures on social protection. In contrast, if social 
protection expenditure is historically low, it may be difficult to increase it 
under the efficiency pressures of globalization, which limits the room for tax 
increases (Kautto and Kvist, 2002). However, path dependency does not mean 
that change does not occur. Globalization might also lead to a convergence of 
welfare states (e.g. Brady et al., 2005; Adelantado and Cuevas, 2006). 
Convergence might take the form of welfare retrenchment in social-democratic 
states, where there might be little room to increase already high tax rates and 
spending further (Huber and Stephens, 2001). In the case of less generous 
states globalization might cause upward convergence as a response to the 
demands of citizens for compensation or as result of increasing political 
integration in the EU and the new aspirations that come with it (Kautto and 
Kvist, 2002). 
For Western Europe, we adapt an extended version of the welfare state 
typology of Esping-Andersen (1990), which groups countries into three 
regimes depending on the degree of stratification, decommodification, and the 
mix between private and public social security institutions. The social-
democratic regimes (Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway) are characterized 
by a high decommodification index, little stratification and social security 
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payments provided universally by the state. In the conservative regimes 
(Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands and Luxembourg) 
social security is provided partly by the state and is partly private, but it is 
strongly linked to the status of employment and to families, with a medium 
degree of decommodification. The liberal regimes (United Kingdom, Ireland 
and United States) are characterized by low decommodification, a low level of 
social security and a priority for the market providing public goods and social 
security payments. This classification has been extended by adding a fourth 
regime, the southern regime, i.e. the Latin rim including Spain, Italy, Greece, 
and Portugal (Ferrara, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Esping-Andersen, 1999). Southern 
countries have a higher degree of fragmentation and polarization than those in 
the conservative regime; a highly collusive mix between public and private 
institutions in the welfare sphere and persistence of clientelism in the 
distribution of cash subsidies.   
We estimate the response of tax and spending decisions in the CEE 
NMS separately as globalization might exert different effects on transition 
countries compared to advanced Western European democracies. Due to the 
transition crisis extensive financial needs emerged, caused by increasing 
unemployment, early pension schemes and a decline of womens‟ participation 
in the labor force (Onaran, 2008; Havlik and Landesmann, 2005). This, along 
with the process of the EU accession, increased the need for developing a more 
comprehensive welfare state (Orenstein and Haas, 2005). However, the 
transition also created negative pressures on tax and spending decisions. In an 
effort to attract Foreign Direct Investment, the Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs) cut corporate income tax rates (Bellak and Leibrecht, 2009) 
or introduced flat rate personal income taxes (Keen et al., 2008). Finally the 
presence of a large informal economy led many governments to lower tax rates 
to encourage formalization (Duman, 2010).   
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In addition to the specific aspects of the macroeconomic environment 
in the post-transition CEECs, these countries constitute welfare regimes in 
transition different from those found in Western Europe. Although early studies 
position the CEECs within the liberal regime with a mix of social insurance 
and social assistance and a partial privatization of social policy with little 
corporatist attributes (e.g. Ferge, 2001; Standing, 1996), later studies argue that 
the CEECs constitute a separate regime type (Aidukaite, 2004; Lelkes, 2000). 
Bohle and Greskovits (2007) distinguish further and identify a neoliberal type 
in the Baltic States, an embedded neoliberal type in the Visegrad states and a 
neo-corporatist type in Slovenia. The Baltic States outperformed the other 
regimes in market radicalism, but lag behind in industrial transformation, social 
inclusion and protection by industrial policy and welfare state institutions. The 
Visegrad states are more socially inclusive, which makes their “neoliberalism” 
embedded, but lag behind in building institutions that safeguard 
macroeconomic stability. The least market-radical type is Slovenia, which 
combines macroeconomic stability with social indicators closer to West 
European standards. Concerning taxation policy, all three Baltic States 
introduced flat tax very early in 1994-95, followed by Slovakia later (Brook 
and Leibfritz, 2005). Fenger (2007) distinguishes a "post-communist European 
type" (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Croatia), a 
"former USSR type" (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Russia and Belarus) 
and a group of developing welfare states (Georgia, Romania and Moldova). 
Orenstein and Haas (2005) group all CEE NMS as well as other former 
Yugoslav republics in a European post-communist welfare state regime. They 
argue that good prospects of joining the EU militated towards the development 
of welfare states in the CEE NMS, and they therefore find less of a difference 
between the Baltic countries and other countries within the CEE NMS.   
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Based on this literature, we first follow Orenstein and Haas (2005) and 
treat the CEE NMS as a single European welfare regime in transition. As a 
second step we distinguish two welfare state regimes, the Baltic and the post-
communist European regime based on Fenger (2007). Thirdly, we conduct a 
jacknife analysis by excluding Slovenia, which is classified as a separate neo-
corporatist type by Bohle and Greskovits (2007).
2
 Finally, we conduct a 
jacknife analysis to all countries in the post-communist European regime to 
make sure that results are not driven by an individual country.   
The paper is structured as follows: Section two describes the data and 
stylized facts. Section three presents the estimation methodology and section 
four discusses the results. Section five concludes. 
2.  Data and stylized facts 
2.1 The Tax Burden on capital income, labor income and consumption 
Different types of tax rates are used as dependent variables in empirical 
studies on the effects of globalization. Statutory tax rates (STRs) on capital or 
corporate income are directly derived from the tax code. However, they do not 
account for the tax base. Effective marginal and average tax rates (EMTRs and 
EATRs) likewise use data from the tax code. They measure the tax burden on a 
hypothetical investment project based on actual tax law data (Devereux and 
Griffith, 1998; Devereux et al., 2002 and 2008). A third widely used measure is 
average effective tax rates (AETRs), calculated by dividing the total tax 
revenue from capital or corporate income, labor income or consumption by the 
pre-tax income of the respective production factor or consumption, based on 
the method of Mendoza et al. (1994) and Carey and Rabesona (2002). These 
rates are backward-looking and are available not only for corporate income but 
also for capital income, labor income and consumption. Eurostat is adapting 
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 It is not possible to include Slovenia as a separate regime due to the limited 
availability of time series data. 
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this method to calculate implicit tax rates (ITRs).
3
 These tax rates are especially 
suitable for exploring whether globalization has led to a decline in the tax 
burden on capital or an increase in the tax burden on labor income and/or 
consumption within a unified framework. Therefore we base our analysis on 
the ITRs. 
For the ITRs Eurostat data is employed (see European Commission, 
2000 and 2009) which, in contrast to other data sources, covers all 27 European 
Union Member States and thus allows an analysis of the CEE NMS. The data 
source for the period starting in 1990 is the Eurostat online database. These 
data are extended backwards to 1970 or 1980 with the growth rates of the ITR 
tax rates calculated by the European Commission (2000). The data on the 
implicit tax rates on capital income for Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia are  
extended with our own calculations, based on the method used by the European 
Commission. Thus, the data for nine countries
4
 reaches back until 1970, for six 
countries
5
 until 1980, and for most CEE NMS until 1995. 
Figures 1-3 show the development of the unweighted average of the 
ITR on capital income, labor income and on consumption grouped by welfare 
state regime. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Although STRs decreased (Devereux et al., 2002; European 
Commission, 2008), due to the broadening of the tax base, the ITR on capital 
income stayed rather stable at 24.9% (overall sample mean). However the level 
of capital taxation is much lower in the CEE NMS with a mean of 16.1% 
                                                     
3
 Eurostat‟s terminology for AETR is ITR. We will further use this 
terminology. 
4
 Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands and United Kingdom 
5
 Austria, Spain, Finland, Greece Portugal and Sweden 
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compared to Western Europe with a mean of 27.0%. Comparing the different 
welfare regimes, the ITR on capital income has fallen in the liberal welfare 
regimes (apart from a recent increase) from 34% to 30.6%, while it has been 
rising in the social democratic regimes in particular since the mid 1990s and is 
now at 36% higher than in the other regimes. In the conservative regimes the 
ITR on capital income slightly decreased from 30.6% to 27.8% over the whole 
period 1980-2007. France stands out among conservative regimes with an ever 
rising ITR on capital income. In the southern regimes the ITR on capital 
income had been considerably lower than in the other welfare state regimes 
until the beginning of the 1990s, but since then it has increased and now 
corresponds to that of the liberal regime. The level of capital taxation is 
considerably lower in both CEE regimes. In the post-communist European 
regimes, the ITR on capital has slightly increased from 16.8% to 17.7%. 
However there are important differences in the trends within the post-
communist European type. In Slovenia the ITR increase started at a very low 
level, while it fell strongly in Slovakia and remained quite stable in the other 
countries. In the Baltic regimes the ITR on capital decreased from 14.6% to 
12.3%, with a major downturn starting at the end of the 1990s. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
The ITRs on labor income are on average higher than those on capital 
income with a mean of 33.26% in the EU 15 and 36.7% in the CEE NMS. Thus 
the difference between the ITR on capital and labor income is much higher in 
the CEE NMS. With the exception of the liberal regimes there is a converging 
trend in the ITRs on labor income. Countries in the social-democratic welfare 
regimes have the highest ITR on labor income, which rose until the mid 1990s 
and then started to slightly decrease. Over the period 1980-2007 it increased 
from 36.1% to 40.5%. The ITR on labor income in the conservative regimes 
lies between those of the social-democratic and liberal regimes. It has 
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constantly risen from 33.8% to 38.2%. Thus, there is a convergence of the tax 
rates on labor in the social-democratic and conservative regimes. The strongest 
increase can be observed in the southern regimes, which started at a very low 
level of 18.9% and increased to 35.2%, reaching nearly the level of the 
conservative regimes.  The liberal regimes  now have the lowest ITR on labor 
income at 25.9%. It increased until the late 1980s and since then it has slightly 
decreased. In the countries of the post-communist European regimes the ITR 
on labor income has a similar level to that in the conservative regime and since 
1999 has decreased from 38.2% to 35.1%. In the Baltic regimes it has fallen 
from 37.4% to 32.4%. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Figure 3 shows the development of the ITR on consumption. The mean 
of the ITR on consumption in the EU 15 is 21.2% slightly higher than in the 
CEE NMS with 21%. The social-democratic regimes again have the highest tax 
burden on consumption, which has slightly increased since 1980s from 27.9% 
to 29.3%. In the liberal regimes the ITR on consumption increased until the 
early 1980s and then decreased slightly since 1985. Overall it rose from 20.8% 
to 22.0%. The conservative regimes show a slightly rising ITR on consumption 
(from 19.9% to 22.8%). Again the southern regimes have the lowest ITR in the 
West, although it has been constantly increasing since 1980 from 10.0% to 
17.2%. The level of the ITR on consumption in the post-communist European 
regimes at 22.6% (2007) corresponds to those of the conservative and liberal 
regimes, whereas the rate in the Baltics is at 20.6% (2007) slightly lower.  
2.2 Social expenditures 
In order to capture the effect of globalization on the composition of spending 
with regard to public consumption goods, we focus on social expenditures, 
rather than intermediate spending categories like education or health, which are 
both public goods and inputs. We prefer normalizing social expenditures by 
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total public expenditures to normalizing by GDP in order to pin down the effects 
on the distribution of spending (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001).   
Eurostat‟s classification of the functions of government (COFOG) database 
provides data on 10 functional expenditure categories, including the item 
„social protection‟ which captures socially motivated expenditures on sickness 
and disability, old age, family and children, survivors, unemployment and 
housing. The advantage of the COFOG data is that it also covers all the CEE 
NMS; however the COFOG data as a ratio to total expenditures in Eurostat is 
available only since 1990. Thus, the time series are extended with data from 
OECD National Accounts Vol. II. 
Figure 4 shows the development of the unweighted average of social 
protection expenditure as a ratio to total expenditures (socexp) for the EU 15 
and the CEE NMS grouped by welfare state regime. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
In the EU 15 the social-democratic regimes have the highest share of 
social protection expenditures as a ratio to total expenditures, which has been 
slightly rising to 41.9% since 1995. The level in the conservative regime is at 
40.4% comparable to that of the social-democratic regimes. The southern 
regimes increased  their level of social expenditures from 32.4% to 38.1% and 
are catching up. Again, stylized facts indicate convergence among the social 
democratic, conservative, and southern regimes. On the other hand in the 
liberal regimes, the share of social expenditures increased until 1994 and since 
then has decreased to a level of 31.4%. In the CEE NMS the share of social 
expenditures has been declining in both regimes. The Baltics have a much 
lower share of social expenditures than the post-communist European type. The 
share in the Baltics has been falling much faster from 32.4% to 27.5% (mainly 
caused by a strong decrease in Latvia), compared to the European type, where 
it decreased from 34.1% to 32.6%. 
13 
 
3. Estimation methodology 
We employ the KOF indices of globalization to measure its effects, 
which were developed by Dreher (2006b) and Dreher et al. (2008a). We use 
both the index of economic globalization (KOFecon) and the index of overall 
globalization (KOFglobal), which captures not only the economic, but also the 
political and social dimension of globalization. KOFecon is composed of the 
actual flows-index, which includes trade, FDI, income payments to foreign 
nationals and portfolio investments, and the index of restrictions, which 
includes restrictions on trade and capital flows. KOFglobal includes KOFecon 
as well as the index of social globalization, which consists of data on personal 
contact, information flows and cultural proximity, and the index on political 
globalization, which consists of data on the number of embassies and the 
membership in international organizations. We think that the multi-dimensional 
KOF indices are a better way to reflect the joint effects of globalization 
compared to individual variables like FDI or trade or restrictions on capital 
flows. 
We introduce a broad set of control variables common to both the 
spending and tax equations based on the previous empirical literature (e.g. 
Adam and Kammas, 2007; Bretschger and Hettich, 2002; Dreher et al., 2008a 
and 2008b; Leibrecht et al., 2011; Swank and Steinmo, 2002; Gemmel et al., 
2008; Sanz and Velazquez, 2007; Winner, 2005).  
The ratio of total expenditures of general government to GDP (variable 
expenditure) captures the importance of the public sector in an economy. It is 
expected to be positively related to the ITRs as higher expenditures should 
induce higher financial needs. It should have a positive impact on social 
expenditures, as in minimalist states these expenditures will probably be of 
lower importance (Dreher et al., 2008a). 
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Government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP (debt) is 
introduced to reflect the budget constraint as well as alternative means of 
finance. Thus it has an ambiguous effect on the ITRs. On the one hand, it can 
serve as a substitute for taxes, if lower taxes are accompanied by debt based 
financing of expenditures. On the other hand higher public debt might induce 
an increase in taxes, when taxes are levied to pay for public debt. On the 
expenditure side, there is also a dual effect. On the one hand an increase of the 
share of interest payments in total expenditures caused by high debts 
simultaneously decreases the share of social expenditures. On the other hand 
pressure to reduce debt might also decrease the share of social expenditures, if 
the cut in expenditures falls mainly on social welfare (e.g. Sanz and Velazquez, 
2007; Leibrecht et al., 2011). Hence a positive as well as a negative effect of 
public debt on the ITRs and social expenditures might be plausible. 
The fraction of population older than 65 years as a share of total 
population (oldage) captures the effect of the increasing proportion of the 
dependent population on the tax and expenditure system. Increasing fiscal 
needs due to an ageing society should lead to higher ITRs and to higher social 
expenditures. However, the effect on labor tax is ambiguous. Pensions are 
either exempted or taxed at a lower rate; therefore the decrease in labor force 
size in an ageing society may lead to lower taxes paid out of labor income, if 
the pressure of the aging society on tax rates on labor income is not strong 
(Adam and Kammas, 2007). 
The growth rate of real GDP (growth) aims to capture cyclical effects. 
It is expected to have a negative effect on taxes as well as social expenditures 
(Bretschger and Hettich, 2002; Adam and Kammas, 2007).  In periods of high 
growth, thus decreasing unemployment, fiscal needs and social transfer 
payments are expected to be lower. As a robustness check we also estimate 
specifications with the unemployment rate instead of economic growth. 
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Inflation measured as the change in the GDP deflator (inflation) is 
expected to affect taxes through two channels. Firstly, tax brackets with 
progressive income tax, personal income tax allowances, or depreciation 
allowances for corporate taxation are not always indexed to inflation; thus the 
ITRs may increase despite constant tax rates. However, if there is a lag in the 
collection of taxes, the tax base increases faster than the revenues; thus the 
ITRs fall. With respect to social expenditures, since most social expenditures 
are not inflation adjusted, a negative effect is expected.   
Government Party (govparty) reflects the composition of the 
government‟s cabinet. It ranges from 1 to 5 (1 = hegemony of right-wing (and 
centre) parties, 5 = hegemony of social-democratic and other left parties). The 
tax rates are expected to be lower, the more right wing the governing political 
parties tend to be, assuming that they would advocate a more tight fiscal policy 
and lower public expenditures, as well as lower taxes to stimulate business and 
increase labor supply. Thus a positive effect of govparty on the ITRs and social 
expenditures is expected. 
As smaller countries are typically more open than larger, a country‟s 
relative size (size) is included in the set of regressors following Winner (2005) 
in order to cope with a possible small country bias in the coefficient of the 
globalization indices. This variable is measured as the proportion of a country‟s 
GDP to the average sample GDP. We expect a positive effect in particular on 
the ITR on capital income as larger countries have an incentive to levy higher 
tax rates (Bucovetsky, 1991). 
Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix contain information on the 
measurement of the variables, the databases used and descriptive statistics.  
We explore the effect of globalization on social expenditures and the 
various ITRs by using the baseline model shown in Equation 1:  
𝐵𝑗𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑗𝑖 + 𝜔𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑗𝑐  𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡   (1) 
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where Bj=social expenditures as a ratio to total expenditures, the ITRs 
on capital income, labor income, or consumption. We estimate separate 
equations for Western Europe and CEE NMS to allow for country-group-
specific coefficients. Thus, the country index i ranges from 1 to 15 for Western 
Europe and from 1 to 10 for the CEE NMS; t is the time index ranging from 
1970-2007 for the ITRs in Western Europe, 1980-2007 for social spending in 
Western Europe, and 1995-2007 in the CEE NMS for all equations. 𝛼𝑗𝑖  are 
country fixed effects, ωjt are time fixed effects, which are included if jointly 
significant. 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡  is the error term.
6
 𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 is the globalization index (KOFecon or 
KOFglobal), and 𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 is the matrix of control variables, all of which except 
for government cabinet gravity
 
enter into the equations with a one year lag. The 
aim of using lagged explanatory variables is to incorporate the time lags in the 
political and fiscal decision process as well as to address the problems of 
endogeneity. Due to the low number of countries (cross-sections), a GMM-
estimation to cope with endogeneity is not possible; therefore we follow 
Wooldridge‟s (2002: 301) suggestion to use lagged explanatory variables as a 
second best approach. Since GMM-estimation is not possible, we also do not 
include a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable to avoid 
endogeneity problems in a fixed effects panel estimation.  
We did not use a seemingly unrelated regression method, since our 
explanatory variables do not vary over the four equations and therefore 
equation-by-equation estimation is as efficient as SUR estimation. The total 
                                                     
6
 Estimations are carried out with Schaffer‟s xtivreg2 Stata command (Schaffer, 
2010). The standard errors are fully robust with respect to serial correlation as well as 
general heteroskedasticity as the variance-covariance-matrix of the error term is 
calculated using the approach developed by Newey and West (1987). The alternative 
cluster-robust standard errors need a rather large number of clusters (here countries) for 
reliable inference (Nichols and Schaffer, 2007).  
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expenditures as a control variable serves as the common exogenous constraint 
on both the revenue and the social expenditure side. It also captures the 
dynamic effects of path dependency. 
Finally we test for the heterogeneity of the effects of globalization in 
different welfare state regimes by estimating the following equation: 
𝐵𝑗𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑗𝑖 + 𝜔𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽𝑗𝑔𝑘 𝐷𝑘𝐺𝑖𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑘=1 + 𝛽𝑗𝑐𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜌𝑘𝐷𝑘𝑇
𝑛−1
𝑘=1 +  𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡      (2) 
where 𝐷𝑘  is a dummy variable representing the different welfare 
regimes; n is the number of different regimes. In Western Europe 𝐷1, 𝐷2, 𝐷3 
and 𝐷4 stand for the social-democratic, conservative, southern and liberal 
regimes respectively, i.e. 𝐷1 is 1 if a country belongs to the social-democratic 
welfare regime and 0 otherwise etc. In the CEE NMS we distinguish between 
two regimes: 𝐷1 stands for the post-communist European regimes and 𝐷2 for 
the Baltic regimes.  The estimated coefficients 𝛽𝑘  can be directly interpreted as 
the marginal effect of a one-unit increase in the globalization index on the ITRs 
or social expenditure in the respective welfare regimes. Due to limitations of 
degrees of freedom, other control variables are not interacted. However, a 
welfare regime specific trend is also included along with time dummies in 
order to account for path-dependency of the particular welfare regimes, which 
are not captured by the control variables or the common time dummies. Due to 
the presence of time dummies, one welfare specific trend cannot be identified. 
Therefore one welfare specific trend is excluded. Regime-specific trends are 
excluded if jointly insignificant.     
4. Estimation Results 
4.1 EU 15  and welfare state regimes 
Table 1 shows the results for the basic specification for the EU 15 
member states. In the EU 15 an increase of economic globalization (KOFecon) 
has a positive effect on social expenditures as a ratio of total government 
expenditures (socexp), whereas overall globalization (KOFglobal) is 
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insignificant. Countries seem to be compensating for increasing economic risk 
caused by globalization by augmenting social expenditures. This compensation 
effect is in line with Gemmel et. al (2008), Hicks and Swank (1992), 
Bretschger and Hettich (2002), Dreher et al. (2008b) and Leibrecht et al. 
(2011), although the measure of globalization may differ among the studies. 
However, Dreher (2006a), Sanz and Velazquez (2007), Dreher et al. (2008a), 
and Potrafke (2009) find no significant effect of globalization on the share of 
social expenditures, but the results are not directly comparable, since they are 
very sensitive to country coverage, as we will show below based on the 
heterogeneity of the effects in different welfare regimes.   
[Table 1 about here] 
Regarding the control variables, high growth, inflation, the relative size 
of a country and public debt lead to lower shares of social expenditures, 
whereas total expenditures have a positive effect on the share of social 
protection expenditures. The fraction of elderly people and government party 
are insignificant. The time dummies are jointly significant in the specification 
with KOFglobal, but insignificant in the specification with KOFecon, and 
therefore excluded in the latter. However, the results are robust, if insignificant 
time effects are included.  Regarding the effect of globalization on taxation, 
there is no significant effect on the tax burden on capital income (Columns (3) 
and (4)). This is in line with Dreher et al. (2008a), Swank (2006) and Swank 
and Steinmo (2002). However, Winner (2005) finds a negative effect of 
globalization on the ITR on capital income, while Dreher (2006a) finds a 
positive effect. Adam and Kammas (2007), Bretschger and Hettich (2002), as 
well as Bretschger (2010) likewise find a negative effect of globalization using 
the ITRs on corporate income as dependent variables. However, their measures 
of globalization are limited to trade volume, and different indices to measure 
legal restrictions. The results are furthermore sensitive to the country sample, 
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as mentioned above. Columns (5) and (6) show the results for the ITR on labor 
income (ITR_lab). Both globalization indices have a positive effect on the tax 
burden on labor income. Thus, while there is no effect on taxes on capital 
income, the tax burden on the immobile factor is rising due to globalization. 
This positive effect is in line with Dreher et al. (2008a), Adam and Kammas 
(2007) and Winner (2005). Likewise, Bretschger and Hettich (2002) as well as 
Garret and Mitchell (2001) and Schwarz (2007) find a shift of the tax burden 
from capital  to labor, when estimating the ratio of taxes on the mobile factor to 
taxes on the immobile factor. Nevertheless, Dreher (2006a) finds no effect and 
Swank and Steinmo (2002) find a negative effect on taxes on labor income; 
however the latter study uses only the liberalization of capital controls (Quinn 
index) as the measure of globalization. The positive effect is, as Ganghof 
(2000) and Adam and Kammas (2007) show, mainly driven by increasing 
social security contributions. 
Regarding the ITR on consumption (ITR_con) economic globalization 
is insignificant, but overall globalization leads to falling taxes on consumption 
(results in Columns (7) and (8)). The negative effect may be due to declines in 
tariffs or agglomeration effects that may offset the pressure to lower taxes on 
capital, and thereby create room for decreasing other taxes, as suggested by 
Dreher et al. (2008a).   
Concerning the control variables, higher total government expenditures 
as a share of GDP (expenditure) and the fraction of elderly people in total 
population (oldage) lead to higher taxes on all three categories. Higher growth 
is associated with a lower ITR on both capital and labor income whereas it has 
no significant effect on consumption taxes. Increasing public debt leads to 
rising taxes on labor income, but declining taxes on capital income and 
consumption. Thus, while public debt and taxes on capital income are 
substitutes, public debt seems to be financed by labor. The composition of the 
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government cabinet (govparty) has a negative effect on the ITR on labor 
income, albeit only significant in the specification with KOFglobal; thus left-
wing governments levy a lower tax burden on labor income whereas  it has no 
significant effect on the ITR on capital or consumption. The relative size of a 
country positively affects the ITR on both capital income and consumption.   
Inflation is insignificant in all specifications. Time dummies are jointly 
significant. 
To summarize, in Western Europe the demand side pressures of 
globalization lead to an increase in social expenditures; however expenditures 
are financed by taxes on labor income. The decline in taxes on consumption, 
which is a regressive tax, offsets part of the increase in the tax burden on labor 
income. On the expenditure side the compensation hypothesis is verified 
whereas on the revenue side efficiency pressures, which increase taxes on labor 
income prevail. As Bretschger and Hettich (2002) and Adam and Kammas 
(2007) suggest, these two hypotheses are complementary rather than 
competing.   
Next, Table 2 reports the results for the four welfare state regimes in 
Western Europe: the social-democratic (social-dem), the conservative 
(conserv), the southern and the liberal regimes. Time fixed effects are jointly 
significant with the exemption of specification (2), where they are excluded. 
However, the results are robust, if insignificant time effects are included.  
[Table 2 about here] 
There are significant differences between the four welfare state 
regimes. As can be seen in Columns (1) and (2) overall globalization 
(KOFglobal) has a positive effect on social expenditures in the conservative 
regime, while in the social-democratic and the liberal regime globalization is 
leading to a decline in social expenditures. In the southern regime social 
expenditures are not affected by overall globalization. Economic globalization 
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(KOFecon) also has a positive effect in the conservative regime, but no 
significant effect in the others. Our results, based on a different database with 
longer time series are similar to Leibrecht et al. (2011).
7
  They indicate that the 
compensation effect is mainly driven by the conservative regime; in the social-
democratic regime the efficiency effect is predominant, but they do not find the 
negative effect in the liberal regime. Globalization is leading to a convergence 
between the conservative regime with lower social spending level and the 
social-democratic regime, which starts from a higher level of social 
expenditure, as suggested in the political economy literature (e.g. Kautto and 
Kvist, 2002; Adelantado and Cuevas, 2006; Achterberg and Yerkes, 2009). 
Thus there is no general race-to-the-bottom in terms of welfare regimes, but 
rather a convergence towards the middle in the case of the conservative and 
social democratic regimes, which can be explained by globalization and 
Europeanization. The negative effect of overall globalization in liberal regimes 
however indicates that catching up convergence is specific to conservative 
regimes.  The lack of a significant effect in southern regimes indicates that in 
these countries domestic factors are more important than international effects in 
driving social expenditures. The decline in social expenditures in the social-
democratic countries has to be evaluated also within the context of the 
consequences of the macroeconomic crisis of the early 1990s in Scandinavian 
countries, which lead to a substantial reversal of fiscal policies. Specifically, as 
steady economic growth and high employment, which were seen as the 
cornerstones of the welfare regime, were challenged by the crisis, governments 
started to consider social cuts (Kautto and Kvist, 2002).
8
 The argument of Huber 
                                                     
7
 Leibrecht et al (2011) use COFOG database which starts only in 1990s. 
8
 In Sweden, for e.g. the base income used to calculate the social benefits was 
reduced from 1989 to 1992, co-payments were introduced for certain medical services, 
and in 1994 a major pension reform was initiated (Hicks, 1999). 
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and Stephens (2001) about the limits of expansion of the welfare regime in 
generous welfare regimes becomes particularly relevant under these conditions. 
The negative effect of globalization on the share of social protection 
expenditures is consistent with this tightening trend in fiscal policy. It is also 
worth discussing the case of the conservative regime, which has high social 
expenditures, but nevertheless has experienced further increases with 
globalization. Firstly, the macroeconomic stability of these countries may have 
helped governments to meet citizens‟ demands for compensation in relation to 
the vulnerabilities created by globalization.  Secondly, in some countries like 
France and the Netherlands, evidence shows that a “catch-up convergence” has 
taken place (Kautto and Kvist, 2002).   
Regarding the effect of globalization on taxes, the results for different 
welfare regimes are reported in columns (3) to (8). Interestingly, in the social 
democratic-regime, rising globalization is leading to decreasing taxes on capital 
income, whereas in the conservative and liberal regimes there is no significant 
effect. There is additionally a negative effect of KOFecon in the southern 
regime, but the effect of economic globalization is insignificant.  Thus, it can 
be argued that in the social democratic regime, where capital taxes have been 
significantly higher, globalization is leading to a downward convergence.   
Globalization leads to a rise in taxes on labor income in the social-
democratic, conservative and liberal regimes, although in the latter only 
KOFecon is significant.  There is no significant effect in the southern regime. 
Even though labor taxes in the southern regime have been rising more strongly 
than in the other regimes, apparently this rise is not caused by globalization, 
but by domestic factors. The magnitude of the positive effect is largest in the 
social-democratic regime.   
Finally, globalization has a negative effect on the ITR on consumption 
in the social-democratic, conservative, southern and liberal regimes. The 
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negative impact in the liberal regime is only due to KOFglobal, and in the 
southern regime it is only caused by KOFecon.  
Overall, the finding at the aggregate level regarding compensation on 
the expenditure side and efficiency in terms of increasing taxes on labor applies 
only to the case of the conservative regime. In the social-democratic regime 
efficiency effects prevail on the expenditure side as well as both sides of the 
revenue; thus the ITR on capital decreases, whereas the ITR on labor income 
increases. However, the decline in the ITR on consumption in both regimes 
partly offsets this trend of increasing tax burden on labor. In the liberal regime, 
the ITR on labor is rising, but again the ITR on consumption decreases; and 
social expenditures is falling, albeit significantly so only in response to overall 
globalization. Again efficiency effects are present on both the revenue and 
expenditure sides. In the southern regime, there is some evidence of an 
efficiency pressure on the revenue side regarding declining taxes on capital, but 
no globalization effects on the expenditure side.  
4.2 CEE NMS and welfare regimes 
Table 3 reports the results for the 10 CEE NMS pooled together. The 
findings indicate that these countries react very differently to increasing 
globalization compared to the EU 15. 
[Table 3 about here] 
In aggregate, in the CEE NMS there is no evidence of a statistically 
significant effect of both globalization indices on social expenditures (socexp) 
or the ITR on capital and labor income. The only statistically significant effect 
of globalization is the downward pressure on the ITR on consumption as a 
consequence of economic globalization; total globalization is insignificant. In 
the literature, the only study that focuses on the CEE NMS is Leibrecht et al. 
(2011), which, however, estimates the effects on the share of social 
expenditures in total expenditures, and not taxes. They find a negative effect of 
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globalization (also using KOF indices) on expenditures; however their 
estimation period is 2000-2006 for most of the CEE NMS, whereas our data is 
updated and for many countries cover the period of 1995-2007; i.e. the earlier 
period of catching up with European welfare standards, and not only the era of 
flat tax reforms in countries like Slovakia and Romania. Furthermore, they do 
not distinguish between different regimes in the CEE NMS due to data 
limitations.  
Concerning the effect of domestic factors in the CEE NMS, higher 
growth and inflation lead to a lower share of social expenditures as expected. 
Higher expenditures as a ratio to GDP also go along with lower social 
expenditures. Interestingly, the fraction of elderly people has a negative effect, 
thus if the share of elderly people is increasing, the share of social expenditures 
is decreasing. This might be related to specific reforms; e.g. Slovakia went 
through a welfare reform in 2004 and cut social assistance benefits 
significantly (Brook and Leibfritz, 2005). Public debt has a positive effect on 
social expenditures, but it is only significant in the specification with 
KOFecon. Thus, in contrast to Western Europe the share of social expenditures 
is increasing along with rising debt. Cabinet gravity (govparty) as well as size 
is insignificant. Time dummies are jointly insignificant. 
Regarding the control variables in the tax equations, total expenditures 
lead to higher ITRs in all three categories, and this is the only significant factor 
that affects the ITR on capital income. Higher growth leads to a lower ITR on 
labor income, but has no significant effect on other taxes. Public debt has a 
positive effect on the ITR on labor income but a negative effect on the ITR on 
consumption; thus debt is financed by taxes on labor, whereas public debt and 
taxes on consumption are substitutes. The composition of government has a 
significant negative effect on the ITRs on labor income and on consumption; 
thus left-wing governments levy a lower tax burden on labor. The share of 
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elderly people (oldage) has a negative effect on the ITR on labor, but it is only 
significant in the specification with KOFecon, and has no effect on other taxes. 
Thus the decrease in the labor force caused by an ageing society leads to lower 
taxes paid out of labor income, since pensions are either exempted or taxed at a 
lower rate (Adam and Kammas, 2007). Size and inflation have no statistically 
significant effect on all three taxes. Time dummies are jointly significant in the 
specifications for the ITR on capital income and consumption, but not in the 
specification for the ITR on labor income. 
Given the insignificance of the effect of globalization on social 
expenditures or the ITR on capital and labor in the pooled estimation, it is in 
particular interesting to repeat the estimations for two different regimes in the 
CEE NMS, i.e. a post-communist European type, which includes Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, and a 
Baltic type, which includes Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Table 4 reports the 
results. 
[Table 4 about here] 
In the post-communist European welfare regime the effect of 
globalization on social expenditures are again insignificant, but in the Baltic 
countries there is a negative effect, although only the effect of KOFglobal is 
statistically significant. Most interestingly there is a significant and negative 
effect of globalization (both indicators) on the ITR on capital in the post-
communist European regime, whereas the effect is insignificant in the Baltics. 
In the post-communist European type we additionally find a negative effect of 
economic globalization on consumption taxes. The effects on the ITR on labor 
income are insignificant. Thus efficiency effects of globalization prevail on the 
revenue side via taxes on capital income in the post-communist European 
regime. However, the ITR on consumption, which is a more regressive tax, has 
been decreasing in this regime, offsetting some of the effects of the decrease in 
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capital taxes. Most interestingly the divergence between the Baltics and the 
other CEE NMS as well as Western Europe in general is widening, as 
globalization exerts further pressures on social spending in the Baltics, which 
already have the lowest shares of spending in Europe. 
As the allocation of the countries to the post-communist regime is not 
unambiguous, we did a jacknife analysis. Although some authors regard 
Slovenia as a separate neo-corporatist regime (e.g. Bohle and Greskovits, 
2007), its exclusion does not affect the results. However, the exclusion of  
Slovakia makes a difference: there is no longer a negative effect on the ITR on 
capital, but there is a significant positive effect on the ITR on labor. 
Furthermore, we do not find a negative effect on taxes on consumption. 
Slovakia has had one of the highest tax burdens in the CEE NMS in the mid-
1990s, but lowered the tax burden on labor income continuously since then, not  
least via a flat tax reform (Brook and Leibfritz, 2005). When Slovakia is 
excluded, the efficiency effect is still at work, but this time via an increase of 
the tax burden on labor. The results are robust to the exclusion of other 
countries. 
Finally, we conducted several robustness tests for our estimations for 
both Western Europe and the CEE NMS. First, cabinet gravity and second, 
inflation were excluded. Third, instead of growth, we estimated all 
specifications with unemployment as a measure of macroeconomic cyclical 




We estimate the effect of globalization on the implicit tax rates (ITR) 
on capital income, labor income and consumption, and the share of social 
protection expenditures in total public expenditures in Western and Eastern 
Europe.   
                                                     
9
 The results are available upon request. 
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In Western Europe globalization leads to an increase in social 
expenditures; thus the demand for compensation prevails. However, these 
expenditures are financed by taxes on labor income. There is no effect on the 
ITR on capital income, whereas the ITR on consumption decreases. The 
decline in the ITR on consumption, which is a regressive tax, offsets part of the 
increase in the tax burden on labor income. Overall on the expenditure side the 
compensation hypothesis is verified whereas on the revenue side efficiency 
pressures prevail. 
However, important differences exist between the welfare states. The 
aggregate outcome is dominated by the trends in the conservative regime, 
where social expenditures increase, but they are financed at an increasing 
extent by taxes on labor as a consequence of globalization. In the social-
democratic regime, not only social expenditures decrease, but also ITR on 
capital decreases, whereas the ITR on labor income increases; thus efficiency 
effects dominate on both the expenditure and revenue sides. The conservative 
and the social-democratic regimes are converging, especially when regarding 
social expenditures. However, the ITR on consumption in both regimes is 
decreasing and partly offsetting the effect of increasing ITR on labor income. 
In the liberal regime, the ITR on labor income increases, the ITR on 
consumption and social protection expenditures decreases; again there is 
evidence of efficiency effects of globalization on the revenue and expenditure 
sides. In the southern regime economic globalization decreases the ITR on 
consumption, while overall globalization has a negative effect on capital taxes, 
but mainly internal factors seem to have led to an increase in consumption, 
labor, capital taxes and the share of social expenditures, leading to an overall 
upward convergence. In the case of the most generous welfare regime, the 
social-democratic countries, convergence works through the efficiency 
pressures on social spending and the ITR on capital; however further increases 
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in labor tax can be evaluated as part of the social democratic consensus to 
preserve parts of the welfare regime without increasing the burden on capital.  
In the CEE NMS, on average, there seems to be no statistically 
significant effect of globalization on social expenditures as well as the ITR on 
capital and labor income. Globalization affects only the ITR on consumption 
leading to a decline. However, when we distinguish between the two different 
regimes in the CEE NMS, there is a negative effect of globalization on social 
spending in the Baltic countries, and a negative effect on the ITR on capital 
income in the post-communist European regime. In both regimes globalization 
leads to a decline in the ITR on consumption, but has no effect on the ITR on 
labor income. Overall efficiency effects of globalization dominate, but on 
different sides of the budget in different regimes in the CEE NMS: in the Baltic 
countries through decreasing social expenditures, and in the post-communist 
European regime through decreasing taxes on capital income. The results of a 
jacknife analysis point to further interesting results: when Slovakia is excluded, 
there is a significant positive effect on the ITR on labor income in the post-
communist European regime, but no effect on the ITR on capital. Thus the 
efficiency effect is still dominant, but this time via an increase of the tax 
burden on labor.   
Finally, from a policy perspective globalization is increasing the 
divergence in terms of the share of social expenditures between the Baltic States 
and the other CEE NMS as well as Western Europe. In Western Europe 
globalization is also exerting some downward pressure on social spending in the 
case of the liberal regime with already low levels of social spending. 
Furthermore, globalization leads to an increase in the tax burden on labor or a 
decline in the tax burden on capital income. Overall, the results imply that some 
coordination of spending and tax policies could improve social cohesion and 
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Figure 1. Implicit tax rate on capital income in the EU grouped by welfare state 
regime 1970-2007 
Note: Due to shorter time series for some countries, the aggregation for the 
regimes start only at a common year, as the aggregation of the unbalanced data 
for a regime could impose a misleading change in the trend of the aggregate 
average for the regime as a whole. Therefore the aggregation for the post-
communist European regime includes only the years 2001-2005. 






Figure 2. Implicit tax rate on labor income in the EU27 grouped by welfare 
state regime 1970-2007. 
Note: Due to shorter time series for some countries, the aggregation for the 
regimes start only at a common year, as the aggregation of the unbalanced data 
for a regime could impose a misleading change in the trend of the aggregate 
average for the regime as a whole. Therefore the aggregation for the post-
communist European regime includes only the years 1999-2007. 






Figure 3. Implicit tax rate on consumption in the EU27 grouped by welfare 
state regime 1970-2007 
Due to shorter time series for some countries, the aggregation for the regimes 
start only at a common year, as the aggregation of the unbalanced data for a 
regime could impose a misleading change in the trend of the aggregate average 
for the regime as a whole. Therefore the aggregation for the post-communist 
European regime includes only the years 1999-2007. 






Figure 4. Social protection expenditures as a share of total expenditures 
grouped by welfare state regime 1990-2007. 
Note: Due to shorter time series for some countries, the aggregation for the 
regimes start only at a common year, as the aggregation of the unbalanced data 
for a regime could impose a misleading change in the trend of the aggregate 
average for the regime as a whole. Therefore the aggregation for the liberal 
regime includes only the years 1990-2007, the aggregations for the social-
democratic regime, the conservative regime and the southern regime the years 
1995-2007, the aggregation for the post-communist European regime 2002-
2007 and for the Baltic regime 2000-2007. 





Table 1. Estimation results for the EU 15 member states, 1970 – 2007* 
 






Table 2. Estimation results for the EU 15 – 4 regimes, 1970 – 2007* 
 






Table 3. Estimation results for the CEE NMS, 1995-2007 
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